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1. Introduction  
How is corporate social responsibility related to firms, investors and shareholder proposals? We  
investigate whether the responsibility of a firm and its investors can be associated with the probability 
of the firm receiving a shareholder proposal on environmental, social or governance issues. Corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) concerns the social, ethical and environmental behavior of a firm as well as 
its governance that goes beyond any legal obligations (Escrig-Olmig et al., 2017; Danilovic et al., 
2015; Baumgartner, 2014; Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim 2014; Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012; 
Lucas, 2010; Fougère and Solitander, 2009; Dahlsrud, 2008). Increasingly, investors engage with 
socially responsible investing (SRI). As such, they try to account for environmental, ethical, social and 
governance characteristics of their investment objects (Al-Najjar and Anfimadou, 2012; Escrig-Olmig 
et al., 2011; White, 1996).   
 In particular, shareholder engagement is used to pressure companies to take on environmental, 
social, or governance activities (see Dimson et al. 2015; Weinstein et al., 2015; Schooley, Renner and 
Allen 2010; González-Benito and González-Benito, 2008; Welford, 2007; O’Rourke, 2003; Halme 
and Niskanen, 2001). Karpoff et al. (1996) find that shareholder engagement, in the form of 
shareholder proposals, is more likely to target poorly performing firms. Cziraki et al. (2010) confirm 
that this negative relationship between shareholder proposal probability and financial performance also 
holds for European firms. They also find that ownership concentration and the stake of institutional 
investors positively influence proposal probability. This contrasts with some other studies. For 
example, González-Benito and González-Benito (2010) investigate which factors affect stakeholder 
environmental pressure on manufacturing firms in Spain and find that company size, industry type, 
internationalization and environmental awareness of the managers are relevant for such pressure. 
Further, Flammer (2015) finds that shareholder proposals on CSR issues have a positive effect on 
firms’ abnormal stock market returns, whereas Dimson et al. (2015) establish that firms with 
reputational concerns and socially conscious institutional investors are more likely to be targeted by 
CSR related shareholder engagements. We aim to contribute to this literature by investigating two 
closely related but separate issues. First,  whether there is a significant relationship between a firms’ 
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CSR performance and being subject to CSR related shareholder proposals at the annual general 
meeting (AGM) of shareholders. Second, whether having responsible institutional investors is to be 
associated with the firm being targeted by proposals on CSR issues at the AGM.  As such, we 
complement the analysis of Karpoff et al. (1996) and Schooley et al. (2010) by focusing on 
environment, social and governance proposals and we expand the analysis of Flammer (2015) by 
accounting for investors’ responsibility within the context of CSR shareholder proposals. This would 
allow us to account for both firm and shareholder responsibility when studying the filing of CSR 
proposals at the AGM. Next to the academic interest, investigating this is relevant for firms as it can 
help them manage their investor relations and for investors as it might help them to efficiently allocate 
their resources. Our study also is of interest from a policy perspective, in particular regarding the role 
of disclosure and transparency of non-financial information of the business community. 
Our study relies on a sample of Fortune 250 companies during the period 2011-2014, which 
we combine with shareholder proposal data from Proxymonitor. Firms targeted by shareholder 
proposals about environmental, social, or governance issues will be compared with firms not subject to 
such shareholder proposals. The CSR characteristics are derived from Thomson Reuters’ Asset4. 
Responsible investing is related to signing up to the UN’s sponsored Principles for Responsible 
Investing. We perform multivariate analysis with logistic regressions and engage in several robustness 
checks. We find that the responsibility of institutional ownership is to be significantly and negatively 
associated with the probability of receiving a shareholder proposal on environmental issues. However, 
a firm’s CSR performance does not seem to systematically affect the probably of being subject to CSR 
shareholder proposals when we control for financial and institutional characteristics. Here, the firm’s 
score on employee well-being is the main exception. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
This section briefly introduces literature on shareholder proposal probability in relation to 
CSR and the investor and motivates the hypotheses we want to test.  
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Karpoff et al. (1996) found that firms with poor prior financial performance (regarding 
market-to-book ratio, operating returns, sales growth) are more likely to attract shareholder proposals 
in general. They study proposals on corporate governance issues during 1986-1990 and rely on 866 
proposals from 317 companies. Using logistic regression, they conclude that these insider-initiated 
governance proposals do not seem to increase firm value, improve operating performance, or influence 
firm policies (Karpoff et al. 1996). Schooley et al. (2010) also rely on logistic regression and study 
governance proposals but focus on the probability of such shareholder proposals being filed. They 
used matched pairs analysis and have 182 firms with proposals on governance and study the period 
1986-2003.They establish there is a significant relationship between corporate governance shareholder 
proposals and the firm’s governance characteristics, especially ownership concentration. The intuition 
behind the positive impact of ownership concentration would be that fewer shareholders have to be 
convinced to vote in favor of the shareholder proposal. The positive relationship from institutional 
ownership suggests that proposal filers count on the voting support of institutional shareholders. Tkac 
(2006) and Rojas et al. (2009) find that activists are more likely to target large, well-known companies 
to maximize the impact of their campaign. They conclude so on the basis of univariate analysis of a 
U.S. sample over the years 1992-2002 and 1997-2004, respectively. González-Benito and González-
Benito (2008) rely on survey data and investigate how firm characteristics relate to stakeholder 
environmental pressure in the Spanish manufacturing industry. Flammer (2015), in a quasi-natural 
experiment, studies the effect of CSR shareholder proposals on financial performance. She uses an 
extensive dataset of U.S. firms during the period 1997-2012 and estimates a discontinuous regression 
model. She finds that the adoption of close call CSR proposals can be associated with a value 
enhancement from the shareholder perspective. These studies suggest that both firm and investor 
characteristics might relate to stakeholder engagement, in particular filing proposals. However, the 
models, methods and samples used differ substantially and there does not appear to be a standardized 
approach regarding how to investigate the topic. We try to complement this emerging literature by 
specifically investigating the core dimensions of a firm’s CSR  in relation to the filing of proposals on 
these dimensions and to examine whether the responsibility of the investor does matter regarding the 
filing of a proposal on CSR issues in a recent period.  
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We will want to test two hypotheses, one relating to the properties of the firm in relation to 
receiving CSR proposals, the other relating to the properties of the investors filing such proposals. As 
to the first hypothesis, the literature suggests that CSR characteristics of a firm might influence it’s 
financial performance and reputation (Edmans, 2011; Dimson et al. 2015; Flammer, 2015). However, 
it cannot be inferred from the literature if CSR performance and the probability of CSR shareholder 
proposals are to be related as none of the papers investigates CSR characteristics in relation to CSR 
proposal probability. If the perception of Schooley et al. (2010) and Karpoff et al. (1996) regarding 
shareholder proposals would be correct, i.e. shareholder proposals are used to mitigate agency 
problems, a negative relationship between the firms’ CSR and the likelihood of CSR shareholder 
proposals is to be expected: shareholders want to improve firm performance and want to discipline the 
firm (hereafter labelled as ‘disciplining’ hypothesis). The presence of such monitoring can reduce the 
potential conflicts arising from agency problems (Bénabou and Tirole 2010).  
However, the relationship between CSR performance and CSR shareholder proposal probability 
might also be explained in another fashion: Firms that perform well on CSR can expect more 
shareholder proposals in this respect as they will have attracted investors who realize that CSR is 
helpful for financial outperformance and want to see this potential realized  (to be labelled as the 
‘positive selection’ hypothesis). Such behavior would result in a positive relation between CSR 
performance and the probability of CSR shareholder proposals. Thus, to test whether, and how, 
shareholders take CSR performance into account when filing a CSR shareholder proposal, the 
following two competing hypotheses are set up:  
Hypothesis 1a: CSR performance of the firm is negatively associated with the probability of 
receiving a shareholder proposal on CSR issues for the firm (‘disciplining’).  
Hypothesis 1b: CSR performance of the firm is positively associated with the probability of 
receiving a shareholder proposal on CSR issues for the firm (‘positive selection’).  
The null hypothesis in both cases is that the CSR performance of the firm is not to be associated 
with the probability of receiving a shareholder proposal on CSR issues.  
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Our second hypothesis focuses on the responsibility of institutional owners and the probability 
of shareholders filing proposals on CSR issues. As this hasn’t been researched before, our hypotheses 
in this respect are of an exploratory nature. Because the responsibility of individual investors is not 
directly observable, and those of institutional investors is only indirectly so, we will focus on the latter 
(see next section). We expect that the responsibility of institutional owners (RIO) is positively related 
with CSR proposal probability. A positive relationship between the responsibility of institutional 
ownership and CSR proposal probability would imply that filers of a CSR proposal express their 
responsibility by such filing (labelled as ‘signaling’ hypothesis). As such, they live up to their 
principles. However, this not necessarily needs to be the case as a negative relationship would suggest 
that responsible investors do not deem it necessary to file CSR proposals. The reason could be that the 
responsible investors expect that their presence already will urge the firm to act more responsible or 
that they already selected firms high on CSR. Apparently, they see no further need for filing CSR 
proposals (labelled as ‘passivity’ hypothesis). Thus, to test the relationship between the responsibility 
of institutional investors and CSR shareholder proposal probability, the following two competing 
hypotheses are set up:  
Hypothesis 2a: The responsibility of institutional owners of the firm is positively associated with 
the probability of receiving a shareholder proposal on CSR issues for the firm (‘signaling’).  
Hypothesis 2b: The responsibility of institutional owners of the firm is negatively associated 
with the probability of receiving a shareholder proposal on CSR issues for the firm (‘passivity’).  
The null hypothesis in both cases is that the responsibility of the institutional investors in a firm 
does not affect the probability that this firm receives a shareholder proposal on CSR issues.  
 
3. Model, data, and methodology  
3.1 Model and variables  
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To explain CSR shareholder proposal probability we will use six different regression models.: 
Environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposal probability are examined separately 
because it is increasingly common to differentiate corporate social responsibility policy along 
environmental, social and governance issues. This is due to the fact that encompassing ratings 
aggregate different dimensions of CSR and that the transmission mechanism between these 
dimensions and the firm’s operations differ (see Chatterji et al., 2009). For each of the three CSR 
dimensions (environmental, social, and governance), we will want to estimate one model with the 
aggregate score regarding environmental, social and governance characteristics (models 2, 4 and 6 
respectively) and one with more detailed constituting items regarding each of these characteristics 
(i.e., models 1, 3 and 5). Our models are line with those of Karpoff et al. (1996), Cziraki et al. (2010), 
and Schooley et al. (2010), who all use the shareholder proposal probability as their independent 
variable. Including environmental and social variables in a model to explain environmental and social 
shareholder proposal probability is consistent with the approach of Flammer (2015), who included 
several types of social and environmental proposals in her analysis to detect the value effects of filing 
such shareholder proposals. 
Our models differ somewhat from prior literature on shareholder proposal probability, such as 
Karpoff et al. (1996), Cziraki et al. (2010), Schooley et al. (2010), namely in that we try to find out 
about the explanatory power of firms’ CSR scores and the responsibility of investors in relation to 
CSR shareholder proposal probability. Further, in contrast to Flammer (2015), we do not investigate 
what actually happens with the voting about the proposals and their aftermath. 
The two models regarding environmental shareholder proposal probability are: 
ܲܧ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚாாோܧܧܴ௧ିଵ ൅
ߚா௉ோܧܴܲ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚாோோܧܴܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧         (1) 
ܲܧ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚா஼ௌோܧܥܴܵ௧ିଵ ൅
ߝ௜,௧              (2) 
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with PEi,t the probability that firm i receives an environment shareholder proposal in year t, MCAPi,t 
relating to market capitalization of firm i in year i, MTB to the market to book value, IOWN to 
institutional ownership, RIO to the responsibility of the institutional investor, EER to emission 
reduction, EPR to product innovation, ERR to resource reduction, and ECSR to environmental 
performance. εi,t is the error term. Thus, environmental performance in model 1 is represented by 
variables on scores on emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. Environmental 
performance in model 2 is represented by an aggregated environmental performance score (ECSR).  
The responsibility of institutional investors (RIO) with a particular firm will be associated 
with CSR shareholder proposal probability at the AGM of that firm. With responsible  institutional 
investors, we relate to investors who include social, environmental and governance considerations into 
their investment decision. In this respect, the signatory list of the United Nations-supported Principles 
of Responsible Investing (UNPRI) is used to verify whether shareholders include such considerations 
into their investment decision-making process or not. To be an UNPRI signatory, an investor has to 
comply with the six principles of UNPRI (see www.pri.org). As only institutional investors are able to 
sign up to these principles, we aren’t able to verify the responsibility of other types shareholders. We 
will examine the responsibility of the largest 50 institutional shareholders in each company (see 
Cziraki et al. 2010). The largest 50 shareholders of a firm are extracted from Orbis, which is a 
database that contains company-specific information. For each firm-year observation the percentage of 
responsible institutional investors is calculated. For example, if Berkshire Hathaway has 75 
institutional shareholders only the 50 biggest of those institutional shareholders are taken into account 
for the RIO variable. Further, as to the calculation of the value of this variable for a particular firm in a 
particular year, if 25 of these 50 institutional investors are on the PRI’s signatory list, the RIO variable 
has a value of 50%, or 0.50. If we would be relying on the sum of shareholdings from responsible 
institutional investors, multicollinearity with the institutional ownership variable would be highly 
likely. Therefore, it is important to realize that the impact of the responsibility of institutional owners 
is examined. The percentage of shares held by institutional investors (IOWN) is used as a control 
variable.  
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For social and governance issues in shareholder proposals we will rely on the following two 
sets of two models respectively, which are highly similar to models (1)-(2): 
ܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚாௐௌܧܹܵ௧ିଵ ൅
ߚ௉ோௌܴܲܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ஼ைௌܥܱܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚுோௌܪܴܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧       (3) 
ܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚௌ஼ௌோܵܥܴܵ௧ିଵ ൅
ߝ௜,௧             (4) 
ܲܩ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ஻ிௌܤܨܵ௧ିଵ ൅
ߚ஻ௌௌܤܵܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௏ௌௌܸܵܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚௌோௌܴܵܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧       (5) 
ܲܩ௜,௧ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߚெ஼஺௉ܯܥܣ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚெ்஻ܯܶܤ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚூைௐேܫܱܹ ௧ܰିଵ ൅ ߚோூைܴܫܱ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚீ஼ௌோܩܥܴܵ௧ିଵ ൅
ߝ௜,௧              (6) 
In models (3) and (4), PSi,t the probability that firm i receives a social shareholder proposal in 
year t. In (3), EWS stands for the employee wellbeing score, PRS for the product responsibility score, 
COS for the community score, and HRS for the human rights score. The wellbeing of employees is a 
combined measure of scores from Asset4 on diversity and opportunity, employment quality, health 
and safety, and training and development. Because all these scores are closely related to employee 
wellbeing we do not include them separately. In (4), SCSR is the overall social score. Models (5) and 
(6) examine governance proposal probability. Here, PGi,t the probability that firm i receives a 
governance shareholder proposal in year t. In (5), governance performance is represented by variables 
on scores on board functions (BFS), board structure (BSS), vision and strategy (VSS), and shareholder 
rights (SRS). The governance performance in model 6 is represented by a weighted governance score 
(GCSR) variable.  
The explanatory variables that are included in all six models are firm size, financial 
performance, institutional ownership, and the responsibility of the institutional investors. The former 
three variables are included because prior research points out these variables have explanatory power 
in shareholder proposal probability (see Section 2). Firm size, financial performance, and institutional 
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ownership act as control variables. Firm size is measured by the market capitalization (MCAP) and is 
extracted from Datastream. MCAP is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding. The market value is given in billions of U.S. dollars. Size is included because Karpoff et 
al. (1996) find that larger firms are more prone to receiving shareholder proposals. The financial 
performance of a firm is measured by the market-to-book ratio (MTB), which especially captures 
value creating potential. Both Karpoff et al. (1996) and Cziraki et al. (2010) find that financial 
performance measured by MTB is inversely related to shareholder proposal probability. MTB is 
extracted from Datastream. Institutional ownership (IOWN) is measured by the sum of percentages 
owned by the biggest 50 institutional shareholders of a firm. For example, if in 2014 Berkshire 
Hathaway’s 50 biggest shareholders have 1.5% of shares each, the IOWN variable for Berkshire in 
2014 will get a value of 75% or 0.75. Cziraki et al. (2010) and Dam and Scholtens (2013) also explain 
the relationship between institutional ownership and shareholder proposal probability by the size of 
the institutional owners.  
3.2 Data  
As we want to test the probability of three different categories of shareholder proposals, 
regarding the corporation’s environmental policy, social policy, and governance policy respectively, 
we need to identify three different sample groups. To this extent, data were obtained from the database 
of Proxymonitor.org on proposals made between 2011 and 2014. Proxymonitor.org is a website 
sponsored by Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. The 2011-2014 time period is chosen because 
Proxymonitor.org only provides historical information on shareholder proposals from 2011 onwards 
and we use one year lags. As such, we focus on the post global financial crisis period. In addition, the 
2011-2014 database yields more observations than the samples of Karpoff et al. (1996), Cziraki et al. 
(2010), and Schooley et al. (2010) who primarily rely on matching analysis which of course impacts 
the sample size. Flammer’s (2015) alternative research design is about the sampling for close call CSR 
proposals and she relies on two databases to which we don’t have access (RiskMetrics and 
SharkRepellent) by which she is able to use more observations than we do. Proxymonitor.org tracks 
the shareholder proposals received by the 250 largest publicly traded companies, ranked by revenue as 
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reported on yearly frequency by the Fortune magazine. Fortune ranks companies which are 
incorporated, operate and file financial statements in the U.S. by revenues in their respective fiscal 
year and classifies the shareholder proposals in several categories. Environmental policy, social policy, 
and governance policy are examples of such categories. From 2011 to 2014, a total of 2,483 proposals 
were recorded at 267 companies. The amount of unique firms observed each year in the 2011-2014 
period is 259, 253, 250, and 256 respectively. In some years more than 250 unique firms are observed, 
hence the Fortune 250 selection criteria is a bit stretched. This is related to the fact that there usually 
are several months between filing a shareholder proposal and the AGM. Management shareholder 
proposals (i.e. proposals filed by the management of the firm) are excluded as these are not 
comparable to “ordinary” shareholder proposals, because managers are inside-owners and may have 
other incentives to file shareholder proposals than the outside-owners, like institutional investors 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). After this filtering, 1,217 CSR shareholder proposals at 211 unique 
companies remain. Multiple shareholder proposals per year on one category (environmental, social, or 
governance) for one firm are treated as a single shareholder proposal event. If we would not follow 
this treatment it might be possible that a specific company is present with multiple observations in the 
proposal probability sample in case they did receive multiple proposals on one topic. Such double, 
triple or quadruple etc. observations would lead to a clustering bias. Further, some firms received 
shareholder proposals and others did not. Then, each sample is constructed in such a way that it 
consists of observations of firms who did receive environmental, social or governance shareholder 
proposals, and of observations of firms who did not receive a shareholder proposal on this particular 
issue. This sample construction method contrasts with those of Karpoff et al. (1996), Cziraki et al. 
(2010), and Schooley et al. (2010). They constructed their sample on the basis of  matching processes.  
[ Insert Table 1 about here please ] 
Table 1 shows the different categories encountered for CSR shareholder proposal and their 
occurrence in the period under review. The subsample for environmental shareholder proposal 
probability consists of 114 unique firm-year observations of firms who received an environmental 
shareholder proposal. The subsample for social proposals and that for corporate governance proposals 
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consist of 278 and 284 observations respectively. Please note that for the corporate governance sample 
the shareholder proposals on executive compensation are excluded (this is because the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires firms allow shareholder votes on executive compensation).  
The CSR scores are extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 (Datastream). Thomson 
Reuters’ Asset4 assesses CSR performance for a wide range of variables on a scale from zero to 
hundred. ASSET4 ESG data is chosen for several reasons. The first reason is that ASSET4 is a global 
dataset and covers more than 4000 companies; it is much more internationally diversified than MSCI’s 
KLD. The availability of overall CSR scores makes the data easy and efficient to work with. Another 
reason to use ASSET4 ESG data is that it is easily accessible via DataStream. ASSET4 ESG data has 
been used in studies on the CSR-CFP relationship, examples are Daszynska-Zygadlo et al. (2016) and 
Dorfleitner et al. (2013).  ASSET4 reports on four pillars which represent different dimensions of 
CSR: economic, environmental, governance, and social. As we already want to use economic 
characteristics as controls,  we will use the aggregate and detail scores on the environmental 
performance pillar, the social performance pillar and the corporate governance pillar. The CSR 
performance of a firm is calculated on the basis of a z-score This z-score is a relative measure; it 
reflects a company’s CSP relative to the average CSP of all other companies that are rated by 
ASSET4. The z-scores are normalized, which entails that ASSET4 scales the z-scores in order to make 
them fit into the range of zero to hundred. This makes them much more useful in research than the 
MSCI KLD ratings.  
[ Insert Table 2 about here please ] 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 and we provide their correlations in Appendix 
A. It shows that the average firm’s market capitalization is $ 18 billion and that responsible investor 
ownership is 48%. Of the three CSR dimensions, the sample firms score highest on governance and 
lowest on social. Most variables do not seem to have high correlations: High correlations are mainly 
observed between weighted pillar scores and category scores. This makes sense because the 
subcategorical scores are the underlying products of the weighted category scores. The variables that 
are included at the same time into one of the models do not exhibit high correlations among each 
other. Therefore the estimation results will not suffer from multicollinearity problems.  
3.3 Methodology  
We employ univariate analysis to arrive at a first pass of the hypotheses and then we present 
the multivariate analysis. Univariate analysis describes the relation between shareholder proposals and 
each variable on its own and is also employed by Tkac (2006) and Rojas et al. (2009). We will 
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compare between firms who received a shareholder proposal on an environmental topic and those who 
did not receive a CSR shareholder proposal, firms who received a shareholder proposal on a social 
topic and those who did not receive a CSR shareholder proposal, and between firms who received a 
governance shareholder proposal and those who did not receive a CSR shareholder proposal. To test 
for the statistical significance of differences between the target firms and their non-target peers, both a 
parametric two sample t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test is undertaken. For the 
multivariate analysis, we rely on the estimations of the six regression models. Multivariate analysis 
examines the impact of a group of independent variables on a dependent variable. In our case, the 
dependent variable in the regression model is a dummy variable; firms did or did not receive a 
shareholder proposal. To account for the properties of this dependent variable, and in line with Karpoff 
et al. (1996) and Schooley et al. (2010), a logistic regression will be estimated to investigate the effect 
of firms’ characteristics on shareholder proposal probability using maximum likelihood to estimate the 
non-linear logistic model. To ensure the standard error estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity, 
Huber-White covariances are used when estimating the regressions.  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Univariate analysis results  
[ Insert Table 3 about here please ] 
Table 3 compares the firms that did not receive a CSR shareholder proposal (the non-target 
firms; column 2) with those that did receive a shareholder proposal on environmental, social or 
governance issues (i.e. target firms; columns 3-11). For all three shareholder proposals types, it shows 
that the size of the corporations that did receive such a proposal is significantly higher than that of 
firms which did not receive such a proposal: The market capitalization and sales for the group of firms 
targeted by CSR shareholder proposals is approximately three times higher as that of non-targeted 
firms. This is consistent with the findings of Tkac (2006), Schooley et al. (2010) and Flammer (2015). 
We observe that  the performance measures confirm previous findings of Karpoff et al. (1996). We 
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further establish that institutional ownership is smaller for firms that are targeted by a CSR 
shareholder proposal compared to the non-targeted firms. Firms targeted by either an environmental, 
social, or governance shareholder proposal, have approximately 10% less institutional owners than 
non-targeted firms. This contrasts with Cziraki et al.’s (2010) finding of a positive association of 
institutional ownership on shareholder proposal probability, but is consistent with Dam and Scholtens 
(2013). Further, we observe that both the parametric and the non-parametric test statistics provide 
quite similar test results. 
Interesting is that firms that receive proposals on environmental issues have significantly 
higher responsible institutional investor ownership.  Regarding firms which receive proposals from 
shareholders on social and governance issues, we do not find a difference regarding the responsibility 
of the institutional owners between targeted and non-targeted firms. This suggests that the second 
hypothesis of no differences between the responsibility of institutional owners with respect to targeted 
and non-targeted firms cannot be rejected in the case of proposal on social and governance issues. 
However, it can be rejected for proposals on environmental issues, confirming the positive selection 
hypothesis (1b).  
When we take a closer look at the constituents of the three pillars, we observe that firms 
targeted by environmental shareholder proposals have significantly higher scores regarding all 
environmental dimensions of CSR. Both the environmental category scores and the weighted 
environmental score are higher for firms targeted by environmental shareholder proposals. Firms 
targeted by social shareholder proposals also have statistical significantly higher scores on employee 
wellbeing performance, human rights performance, and the overall social performance. Further, firms 
targeted by governance shareholder proposals score significantly higher on vision and strategy, and on 
the overall governance score.  
On the basis of the univariate analysis, it seems that especially the ‘positive selection’ aspect is 
at stake (hypothesis 1b); investors are more involved with companies that already perform relatively 
well regarding environmental issues of CSR and the proposals are meant to let them excel even more. 
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We do not find support for the ‘disciplining’ hypothesis (1a) where investors file proposals with firms 
performing poorly on CSR. The ‘positive selection’ hypothesis does also hold in the case of the 
overall social and governance scores, but cannot be confirmed for all specific subcategories. Further, 
regarding the role of responsible institutional owners, we find some support for the ‘signaling’ 
hypothesis (2a) in the case of environmental firm characteristics; responsible owners appear to signal 
their responsibility by filing proposals with companies that already perform relatively well and not 
with those that underperform. We find no support for the ‘passivity’ hypothesis (2b). 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis results  
[ Insert Table 4 about here please ] 
Table 4 provides the results of the six regression models introduced in section 3.1. In models 
(1) and (2), where environmental shareholder proposal probability is the dependent variable, 
responsible institutional ownership is positive and statistically significant. However, none of 
coefficients of the four items investigated does suggest a statistical significant relationship with 
environmental shareholder proposal probability. This clearly contrasts with the univariate analysis 
results, and shows the value-added of using our model. In regression models (3) and (4), with social 
shareholder proposal probability as the dependent, only employee wellbeing is positive and significant 
associated with social shareholder proposal probability. This is in line with the results of Edmans 
(2011)  with the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”. In regression models (5) and (6), 
with governance shareholder proposal probability as our dependent variable, there is no significant 
relationship with the individual items. Unlike the univariate results, regression models (1)-(6) indicate 
that most of the individual and general CSR categories are not significantly influencing the probability 
of shareholders filing CSR proposals, except in the case of employee wellbeing. Employee wellbeing 
seems to have a positive influence on social shareholder proposal probability, albeit only marginally 
so. Thus, overall, it seems that CSR performance does not affect relate to the probability of 
shareholders filing CSR proposals. Thus, we conclude that most findings on the basis of the univariate 
analysis no longer hold and that the null hypotheses 1a and 1b cannot be rejected. As such, our 
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analysis cannot confirm the findings of Schooley et al. (2010) for governance, but  are consistent with 
those of Flammer (2015) in the case of environmental performance, but not for social and governance 
performance.  
The results regarding the responsibility of institutional owners and CSR proposal probability 
are of interest for testing hypotheses 2a and 2b. We find that environmental shareholder proposal 
probability exhibits a highly significant positive relationship with the responsibility of institutional 
ownership, whereas other types of shareholder proposals probability do not exhibit such an influence. 
The responsibility of institutional owners of the firm positively affects the probability of receiving an 
environmental shareholder proposal, which tends to provide support for hypothesis 2a. Because the 
parameters for the responsibility of institutional ownership in model (3)-(6) are not statistically 
significant, the second null hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of shareholder proposals on social 
and governance issues.   
4.3. Robustness analysis  
To investigate the robustness of our multivariate analysis, several regression models and 
estimation methods are conducted. First, to verify the robustness of the control variables, firm size and 
financial performance, MCAP and MTB are replaced with the amount of sales (SAL) and the three 
year cumulative stock return (3SR). We find that the statistical significance levels of 3SR differ from 
those for MTB in the main regression models (results available upon request with the contacting 
author). Also a few CSR performance dimensions now exhibit statistically significant levels, namely 
the encompassing environmental score and the vision and strategy of the firm.  
Next, the RIO variable is replaced with a variable that measures the percentage shares held by 
responsible institutional investors (results available upon request with the contacting author).  Recall 
that the RIO variable measures the responsibility of institutional investors. A drawback of this 
substitute variable is that it has a correlation of 0.5 with the IOWN variable. Despite the relatively 
high correlation, the substitute variable shows for all regression models, except model 5, statistically 
significant values. This suggests that the responsibility of  investors might also matter regarding the 
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likelihood of filing shareholder proposals on social issues. The values from other statistical significant 
variables, like market capitalization and employee wellbeing, have become somewhat smaller. The 
explanatory power of the institutional ownership variable is now significantly negative in all of the 
models, which is in line with the passivity hypothesis (2b).  
To test the validity of using the logistic regressions, and to provide more easily interpretable 
results, the six main regression models also are re-estimated with the more common pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method (results available upon request with the contacting author). The results of 
the pooled OLS estimating models are in line with the results of the logistic regression approach. 
Employee wellbeing is again the only statistical significant CSR category in explaining social 
shareholder proposal probability and confirms Edmans’ (2011) findings. The vision and strategy score 
is now at the 10% statistical significance level for governance shareholder proposal probability. The 
signs of the control variables and RIO variable are similar to those in the logistic regression models.  
Finally, the logistic regression estimations are conducted on the basis of an alternative sample 
construction method (results available upon request with the contacting author). Recall that to arrive at 
the main results, the sample is constructed with firms that received a shareholder proposals on a 
specific topic (environmental, social, or governance) and firms that did not receive any CSR 
shareholder proposal. Now, alternatively, the sample is constructed with firms that received a 
shareholder proposals on a specific topic and firms that did not receive a shareholder proposal on the 
respective topic. So for example: if Berkshire Hathaway received a shareholder proposal on an 
environmental topic and Apple received a shareholder proposal on a governance topic, both 
observations will be included in the environmental sample where Berkshire’s dependent variable 
(dummy) will get a value of one, and Apple’s dependent variable will get a value of zero. As such, the 
‘non-target’ part of the environmental robustness sample also includes firms that did receive 
shareholder proposals on social or governance topics. Re-estimating the models gives results that are 
highly identical with those based on the original sampling approach. This supports the main finding, 
namely that responsible institutional ownership is specifically related to environmental shareholder 
proposal probability.  
18 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
We studied whether responsible institutional investors and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) performance of a firm can be associated with the probability of this firm receiving a 
shareholder proposal on environmental, social, or governance issues. We measure the responsibility of 
institutional investors by the relative ownership of the fraction of the 50 biggest institutional owners of 
a firm that have signed the United Nations supported Principles of Responsible Investing (PRI). The 
CSR performance of a firm is measured by several environmental, social, and governance performance 
scores that are provided by Thomson Reuters’ Asset4.  
For our sample of Fortune 250 companies in the 2011-2014 period, we find that the 
responsibility of institutional ownership of a firm positively and significantly relates to the probability 
that shareholders file proposals  on environmental issues. Further, it shows that  shareholder proposal 
probability is to be positively associated with the firm’s performance on employee wellbeing, 
confirming previous findings by Edmans (2011). In addition, we establish that most other CSR issues 
do not seem to be significantly related to the probability of receiving a proposal from shareholders on 
CSR. Our extensive robustness analysis confirms the reliability of our findings.  
The implications of our study for the business community are that listed companies might want to 
consider paying more attention to the responsibility policy of their shareholders and disclose more 
information regarding especially their environmental. This is because in particular investors who did 
sign up to the PRI file proposals on environmental issues. Doing so could improve shareholder 
relations and increasing their investor base. For investors, and responsible investors in particular, 
selecting and engaging with companies which disclose non-financial information provides additional 
information which allows for improved decision making regarding the allocation of resources. From a 
policy perspective, our study shows the role of disclosing CSR information at the level of firms, 
markets, and investors and is a call for more guidance in this respect as more transparency in society 
will reduce the misallocation of scarce resources. This is because markets are not very well informed 
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about the external effects of corporate action. Policy makers and market authorities should realize that 
financial and corporate markets will operate much more efficiently if informational asymmetries are 
being reduced. Therefore, we also suggest further research should try to gather better quality CSR data 
and try to provide more insights into the responsibility characteristics and conduct of owners and 
investors.  
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Table 1 
ESG shareholder proposal categories 
This table shows the topics of the shareholder proposals which are part of the environmental, social 
and governance samples. The ‘miscellaneous’ categories contain shareholder proposals on a too broad 
variety of topics to categorize them separately 
 
Environmental  Social Governance 
Environmental 
reporting 
52 Political spending 97 Chairman 
independence 
127 
Emission reduction 14 Lobbying and 
political spending 
72 Written consent 51 
Resource reduction 8 Human rights 37 Special meetings 36 
Miscellaneous 40 Employment rights 23 Declassify the Board 25 
  Animal rights 18 Proxy access 11 
  Health care 3 Shareholder rights 
plan (poison pill) 
2 
  Miscellaneous 28 Miscellaneous 32 
 114  278  284 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Number 
of 
obser-
vations 
Median Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Market capitalization 
($bn) (MCAP) 
991 17.63 36.22 52.31 0.25 499.70 
Market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) 
991 1.80 3.35 26.61 -138.98 665.84 
Sales ($bn) (SAL) 1,000 18.03 35.83 49.07 2.12 476.29 
Sales growth (%) 
(SALG) 
989 4.89 8.26 15.84 -51.09 132.46 
3-year stock return (%) 
(3SR) 
984 8.50 10.14 19.41 -60.29 285.21 
Institutional ownership 
(%) (IOWN) 
969 65.27 66.59 14.47 16.26 99.95 
Responsible 
institutional ownership 
(%) (RIO) 
958 48.00 47.26 7.11 22.00 68.00 
Emission reduction 
(EER) 
963 79.23 68.88 27.01 7.33 94.97 
Product innovation 
(EPR) 
963 64.23 61.97 30.36 10.45 97.70 
Resource reduction 
(ERR) 
963 82.67 71.99 26.28 7.57 95.06 
Environmental score 
(ECSR) 
963 80.63 70.26 26.57 8.30 95.05 
Employee wellbeing 
(EWS) 
963 63.86 63.78 18.61 4.47 95.25 
Product responsibility 
(PRS) 
963 49.55 54.33 27.18 3.14 97.30 
Community (COS) 963 71.50 67.25 23.28 3.73 96.79 
Human rights (HRS) 963 71.90 62.74 33.00 9.67 97.43 
Social score (SCSR) 963 71.83 68.10 22.89 3.64 97.29 
Board functions (BFS) 963 82.45 81.67 7.07 35.99 91.49 
Board structure (BSS) 963 85.77 81.98 11.28 18.92 92.03 
Vision and strategy 
(VSS) 
963 77.05 65.16 29.28 8.67 94.41 
Shareholder rights 
(SRS) 
963 64.47 63.49 25.51 10.51 98.88 
Governance score 
(GCSR) 
963 83.50 81.25 12.00 31.58 96.58 
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Table 3. Univariate analysis 
This table reports the means of financial performance, ownership information, and corporate social responsibility scores for Fortune 250 firms that are, and are 
not, targeted by ESG shareholder proposals between 2011 and 2014. The means of the non-target firms are based on year observations of firms that did not 
receive an ESG shareholder proposal during the respective year. Shareholder proposal target firms are separated into environmental, social, and governance 
groups. The means of the group are based on year observations of firms that received one or more shareholder proposal during the respective year on a 
respectively environmental, social, or governance topic. Firm characteristics are measured at 1 January of the year before the shareholder proposal is being 
voted on at the annual general meeting. The t-and z-statistic both measure the statistical significance of the difference between a target firm group and the non-
target firm mean and median, respectively (the median is not reported).  
 Non-target 
firms 
Target firms 
 Environmental Social Governance 
(1) Mean 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
t-stat 
(4) 
z-stat 
(5) 
Mean 
(6) 
t-stat 
(7) 
z-stat 
(8) 
Mean 
(9) 
t-stat 
(10) 
z-stat 
(11) 
MCAP 19.12 65.64 5.88*** 9.25*** 68.17 10.29*** 13.69*** 61.83 9.31*** 11.82*** 
MTB 1.89 2.81 1.65* 3.28*** 6.66 1.59 2.87*** 6.32 1.53 2.93*** 
SAL 22.41 65.51 4.88*** 5.82*** 61.33 8.53*** 11.42*** 58.57 7.79*** 10.47*** 
SALG 8.95 6.81 -1.62 -0.90 7.57 -1.10 -1.92* 6.83 -1.96 -1.99*** 
3SR 9.99 10.19 0.11 0.39 9.76 -0.17 -1.07 10.23 0.16 0.90 
IOWN 70.70 59.03 -8.24*** -7.19*** 61.38 -9.08*** -8.39*** 62.61 -7.39*** -7.07*** 
RIO 47.24 49.10 2.48*** 2.42*** 47.30 0.11 0.23 47.46 0.44 0.05 
EER 63.66 73.72 3.94*** 2.72***       
EPR 56.39 69.32 4.26*** 3.60***       
ERR 67.38 76.52 3.36*** 3.62***       
ECSR 64.61 76.69 4.59*** 3.74***       
EWS 60.60    68.16 5.84*** 4.92***    
PRS 53.87    54.90 0.50 0.42    
COS 66.98    67.72 0.43 0.01    
HRS 59.02    68.14 3.60*** 3.51***    
SCSR 64.38    73.02 5.35*** 3.98***    
BFS 81.65       81.94 0.58 0.82 
BOS 81.45       82.77 1.58 1.18 
VSS 60.37       71.56 5.23*** 5.17*** 
SRS 61.96       63.49 0.80 0.53 
GCSR 80.15       82.40 2.59*** 2.58*** 
The degree of statistical significance is indicated by asterisks, where *, **, and *** represent a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. For abbreviations, see Table 2. 
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Table 4. Multivariate analysis.  
This table reports the characteristics related to the probability of firms receiving an ESG shareholder proposal based on logistic regressions. Firm 
characteristics are measured at 1 January of the year before the shareholder proposal is being voted on at the annual general meeting. The dependent variable 
is a dummy which is equal to one if a firm is targeted by a shareholder proposal (on environmental, social, or governance topic), and equal to zero if the firm 
is not targeted by an ESG shareholder proposal. *,**, and *** indicate whether the parameter is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The pseudo-R2’s and percentage of correct predictions indicate how well the regression models fit the data.  
 
 Environmental Social Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -3.189** -3.284*** -0.864 -0.897 -1.770 -0.956 
MCAP 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 
MTB 0.017 0.017 0.008** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 
IOWN -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
RIO 0.060*** 0.060*** -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.007 
EER 0.004      
EPR 0.004      
ERR -0.002      
ECSR  0.008     
EWS   0.012*    
PRS   -0.001    
COS   -0.005    
HRS   -0.003    
SCSR    0.004   
BFS     0.007  
BOS     0.001  
VSS     0.005  
SRS     0.000  
GCSR      0.002 
Correction predictions 
(%) 
71.7 69.8 72.5 71.7 66.7 67.8 
Pseudo R2 .194 .195 .186 .183 .141 .137 
       
The degree of statistical significance is indicated by asterisks, where *, **, and *** represent a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. For abbreviations, see Table 2. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 - Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 MCAP 1.00                    
2 MTB .02 1.00                   
3 SAL .68 .00 1.00                  
4 SALG .01 -.01 .00 1.00                 
5 3SR .05 .03 -.01 .13 1.00                
6 IOWN -.26 .02 -.14 .02 .01 1.00               
7 RIO .05 .02 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.03 1.00              
8 EER .26 .05 .10 -.10 -.13 -.04 .01 1.00             
9 EPR .30 .00 .18 -.03 .00 -.08 .00 .58 1.00            
10 ERR .24 .05 .09 -.13 -.09 -.05 .04 .77 .57 1.00           
11 ECSR .28 .04 .13 -.10 -.09 -.05 .01 .89 .81 .89 1.00          
12  EWS .20 .02 .06 -.06 -.10 -.05 .02 .64 .42 .61 .63 1.00         
13 PRS .04 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.04 .08 .03 .36 .41 .37 .43 .37 1.00        
14 COS -.07 -.04 -.12 -.04 -.03 .05 -.02 .41 .26 .39 .40 .52 .27 1.00       
15 HRS .26 .01 .13 -.08 -.02 -.06 .02 .49 .48 .53 .56 .41 .33 .25 1.00      
16 SCSR .19 .01 .07 -.09 -.09 -.01 .02 .70 .53 .70 .73 .91 .58 .64 .64 1.00     
17 BFS -.01 .00 .04 -.10 -.07 -.02 .05 .10 .07 .13 .12 .09 .03 .11 .02 .10 1.00    
18 BSS .00 -.06 -.02 -.01 .05 .16 .01 .00 .02 .00 .01 .05 .05 .08 -.03 .06 .08 1.00   
19 VSS .25 .03 .13 -.09 -.11 -.04 .03 .74 .54 .70 .75 .67 .37 .43 .46 .72 .15 .05 1.00  
20 SRS .09 .04 .05 .05 .03 .06 .03 -.02 .00 -.06 -.04 .09 .12 -.03 -.03 .05 .02 .06 .02 1.00 
21 GCSR .15 .03 .06 -.06 -.06 .12 .03 .49 .34 .44 .48 .52 .34 .33 .30 .55 .9 .31 .69 .55 
For abbreviations, see Table 2. 
The degree of statistical significance is indicated by asterisks, where *, **, and *** represent a statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
